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Abstract. Mankind is actively trying to communicate with extraterres-
trial life. However, historically the discovery of new civilizations has led
to war, subjugation, and even elimination. With that in mind, we believe
that for any attempted contact with extraterrestrials our location must
not be revealed. Therefore, we focus on the problem of location-private
interstellar communication. We approach this as a security problem and
propose to work towards solutions with tools from the domain of secure
communications. As a first step, we give proposals for adversary models,
security requirements, and security controls.
1 Introduction
Scientists have been working to find evidence of extraterrestrial life both pas-
sively and actively. Passively, by listening for radio signals in the SETI project
and detecting the “Wow! signal”, for instance, and actively by sending out sig-
nals such as Cosmic Call and a reply to the Wow! signal, as well as objects such
as the Voyager and Pioneer space probes. The two Pioneer probes carry a golden
plaque1 and the two Voyager probes contain a golden record with information
pointing out the location of Earth.
Our view is that in any attempts at communications with extraterrestrials,
our location must not be revealed lest the receiving party be hostile. We therefore
propose to develop methods and technology to support communication with
extraterrestrialswhile keeping the Earth’s location secret. The ability to keep
our location secret depends on the capabilities of the involved parties and the
physical laws involved. Even with an imperfect knowledge and understanding
of these, we can explore the relationship between assumptions on adversary
capabilities and the possibility of location private communication. This work
takes a first step in the problem of location-private interstellar communication by
viewing it as a security problem and working towards a solution from the domain
of secure communication. We provide first proposals for security requirements,
security controls and for classifying adversary capabilities.
1 Note that revealing possession of rare minerals to foreigners has historically not
worked well on Earth.
2 To Communicate or Not To Communicate?
The problem of communicating with extraterrestrials is of an interdisciplinary
nature and, consequently, it has been studied in disciplines that range from signal
processing to futurology [12]. Interestingly, information security specialists have
hardly touched upon the topic, even though our community may have valuable
input on various aspects of this problem.
The potential benefits from contact with extraterrestrials are significant. Any
contact would lead to an increase in knowledge on Earth. It could give an answer
to the fundamental question “are we alone or is there life out there?”, provide ev-
idence that our physical theories are incomplete, and lead to an actual exchange
of knowledge with extraterrestrials.
However, contact with extraterrestrials carries risks and ethical issues. Dis-
covery of new countries and new indigenous people on Earth has often led to
subjugation or even elimination. There is no reason to assume that extraterrestri-
als are selfless. Extraterrestrials might accidentally ruin mankind. For example,
mankind may not be ready to handle technology that is normal to extraterrestri-
als. Is it ethical for a group of people to try to actively contact extraterrestrials
when the result could impact Earth’s entire population? Any contact with ex-
traterrestrials will only occur tens, if not hundreds of centuries after the initial
attempt. Can our generation make such a profound decision for (distantly) future
generations?
Another side to the discussion is that it is useless to worry about contact with
extraterrestrials. One argument on this side is that mankind has been sending
radio and TV signals for a while now. However, such signals have not been sent
with high power and were not directed, meaning the information in them is
too dissipated to decipher. In fact, Billingham and Bedford [1] make a case that
even the highly powered, focused interstellar messages mankind has already sent
are undecipherable (but still detectable as artificial) by the most current Earth
technology after a few dozen light years. Moreover, even the artificial nature of
the signal is too dissipated after a few hundred light years.
To date, the transmission of nearly a dozen interstellar messages has been
made public [9]. These messages may not only reveal our location, they also
contain information about mankind that may make us vulnerable as has been
argued by Lestel [6]. This information includes, for instance, an indication of our
level of scientific achievements: we are able to send out such a signal, but not
able to travel so fast to obviate the need for these signals. It also contains an
upper bound on our energy budget, i.e., the total of the Sun’s output.
3 Adversary Model
One might argue that any communication with extraterrestrials must inevitably
give away our location. For instance, successful communication requires that a
message sent must reach its destination. The extraterrestrials could follow the
messages until they find us.
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However, impossibility of Location Privacy is not necessarily a tautology. Any
proof that location privacy is impossible in a communication with extraterrestri-
als must make assumptions regarding physical laws as well as the computational
and technological capabilities of both communication partners. Such assump-
tions therefore constitute a model for the impossibility of location privacy. By
modifying the assumptions so as to weaken the extraterrestrials’ capabilities suf-
ficiently, and strengthening our own capabilities, we can find a model that does
support location-private interstellar communication. Therefore, while we do not
know what exact capabilities extraterrestrials may have and our understanding
of physics in space may be limited, we can still explore the relationship between
these assumptions and the possibility of location private communication.
We now present an initial adversary model for intergalactic communication.
The model is defined by the capabilities an adversary is assumed to have.
3.1 Adversary Types
We distinguish the following types of adversaries.
a) extraterrestrial communication partner;
b) third party extraterrestrial;
c) local (Earth-bound) party.
In the remainder of this paper, we will focus on extraterrestrial adversaries,
although all three types of adversaries can attack our location privacy. For in-
stance, not all Earth-bound parties may want to maintain location privacy.
3.2 Technological Capabilities
For extraterrestrial adversaries, we can furthermore classify a civilization ac-
cording to its capabilities with respect to detection (of electromagnetic waves
and objects), communication and travel. We propose a categorization of these
capabilities on an increasing scale in Table 1, similar to the Kardashev scale [5].
detection communication travel
1. Planet Type D1 Type C1 Type T1
2. Stellar system Type D2 Type C2 Type T2
3. Galaxy Type D3 Type C3 Type T3
4. Intergalactic Type D4 Type C4 Type T4
Table 1. Scales for estimating a civilization’s capabilities for different categories.
The table denotes the extent (within home planet, own stellar system, home
galaxy, and intergalactically) to which a civilization is able to perform a task
reliably. For instance, we do not consider unintentionally leaked signals to con-
stitute a capability to communicate. However, the exact threshold for reliable
performance in a given category is out-of-scope of this paper. Moreover, these
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broad categories need to be refined in any specific instance, as any communi-
cation attempt will rely on both sender and receiver capabilities. For example,
a civilization capable of sending devices into the galaxy (Type T3 concerning
devices) may send devices that emit radio waves within a stellar system. These
waves will only be detected by a civilization that can detect radio waves within
their stellar system (Type D2 with respect to radio waves), while the device
itself will be detected by a civilization that can reliably detect devices entering
their stellar system (Type D2 for devices). In the rest of the paper, we consider
detection capabilities for satellite-sized devices unless clearly indicated.
The classifications of Table 1 help us determine the effect an adversary may
have. For example, if mankind attempts to communicate by sending a probe that
transmits radio messages, a Type T3 civilization is able to travel to the probe
to examine it in detail, while a Type D1 civilization will not detect the probe,
and might even not be able to detect the attempted communication. Note that
there are relations between the capabilities. For instance, communication is at
least as fast as travelling, since messages may be delivered by a travelling device
or being.
We classify mankind as reliably able to detect satellite-sized devices near
Earth (notwithstanding the occasional unexplained disappearances of large scale
structures such as airplanes). While mankind has sent messages and devices
beyond the Solar system, such communication and travels are neither easy nor
timely. Thus our present abilities are between a Type D1-C1-T1 and a Type D1-
C2-T2 civilization.
From an anthropomorphic point of view, it makes sense to consider extrater-
restrial adversaries with capabilities more advanced but close to ours, that is, a
Type D2-C2-T2 civilization. Type D3 adversaries would be able to detect device
launches on galactic scales. Maintaining location privacy against such an adver-
sary without a pre-existing galaxy-wide infrastructure (a Type C3 capability) to
support location privacy might be impossible. On the other hand, a Type D2-C2-
T2 adversary (or more primitive) is restricted in travel and detection capabilities,
and is therefore unlikely to physically interact with any device sent from Earth.
For such adversaries, we can focus on how much location privacy is attainable
without considering what a physical communication device may reveal about
Earth’s location.
4 Envisioned Controls for Location Privacy
To illustrate the possibility of interstellar location-private communication, we
discuss two potential privacy controls, cf. Table 2. The proposed controls are
able to provide location privacy against certain adversary capabilities. The ef-
fectiveness of any specific control depends not only on the capability of the
adversary, but also on the distance between the adversary and the sender. A D2
adversary can only reliably detect transmissions within a stellar system. This is
enough to pinpoint communications originating from other planets in the same
system, but insufficient for any communications originating from beyond the
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Approach to location-privacy protects against adversaries up to
1. Private Communication Probes D2-C2-T2
2. Random Relay Network D3-C3-T3
Table 2. The discussed approaches for location-private interstellar communication.
stellar system. In the remainder of this section, we consider a setting where the
sender is in a different stellar system than the adversary.
Communication Strategies. The search for extraterrestrial intelligence can
be performed passively or actively. Passive search is currently conducted with
low impact devices, such as telescopes and radio receivers. Such devices are
relatively small in relation to the current footprint of intelligent life on Earth
and the devices themselves will not contribute to the already existing risk of
revealing our location. However, there are even risks involved in passive search.
We list three examples of such risks:
– Size. Larger devices, of stellar size possibly, might be needed to detect a
particular type of extraterrestrial signals. Such devices may be detectable at
interstellar distances.
– Malicious payload. Received signals may have a payload that can trigger
actions on Earth that lead to revealing our location.
– Targetted message. Any reply to a received message will probably relate to
the received message, for instance by quoting some parts. Revealing this link
carries a risk, as the initial message may have been keyed to our solar system.
Thus, any reply may allow the senders to determine which message the reply
was to, and hence what stellar system must have sent this reply.
In the case of active search, we will distinguish direct from indirect transmis-
sions. Direct transmissions require sending and receiving devices for the com-
munication partners, but do not require an interstellar communication infras-
tructure. Examples of direct communication are the emission of electromagnetic
or gravitational waves. Indirect transmissions require an interstellar communi-
cation infrastructure to relay the messages. Such an infrastructure can consist of
already existing natural artefacts in space, such as stars and planets, or may be
constructed by humans. An extreme example of the use of natural artefacts for
indirect communication is to cause a stellar explosion2. Possibilities of setting
up a dedicated interstellar infrastructure have been proposed, such as von Neu-
mann probes, Bracewell probes, and Sandberg probes [4]. Below, we discuss some
points related to setting up and using such an infrastructure, and we provide
two examples of security controls that establish location privacy against certain
adversaries using indirect transmissions.
2 Admittedly, with the drawback of a relatively low bitrate and quite significant
APBDC (Average Per-Bit Delivery Cost).
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4.1 Private Communication Probes
To communicate a message to extraterrestrials we assume the existence of self-
replicating probes, which we call private communication probes (PCPs). The
PCPs replicate with the aid of resources found in their vicinity. After a successful
replication, the original probe self-destructs. The probes replicate into n > 1
descendant probes. Descendants “fly off” into different directions. If a probe
has contact with extraterrestrials, it takes an answer from the extraterrestrials
and communicates it back with the same algorithm: The probe replicates such
that each of its descendants (reply probe) has a copy of the reply and each
descendant flies off in a different3 direction. We must ensure that there is a
significant probability that a reply probe finds us.
However, this approach might never give us an answer due to the Targetted
message risk mentioned before: If we receive an extraterrestrial probe, we should
worry that the probe will communicate our location back to the extraterrestrials.
Thus, in order to not reveal our location, we would have to disperse “mailbox”
probes throughout the galaxy. The contact of a mailbox probe with an extrater-
restrial probe would allow both parties to communicate without revealing the
location of the home planet.
For PCPs to provide location privacy, the adversary must not be able to
trace the original message to its source, nor the reply to its intended receiver.
Thus, barring implementation errors, the PCPs should provide location privacy
against an adversary located in our galaxy, as long as the adversary is of at most
Type D2-C2-T2. PCPs would not be effective against a D3 adversary, because
such an adversary could detect the initial launch of the PCPs.
4.2 Random Relay Network
Our second proposal borrows ideas from the area of wireless sensor networks.
We assume the existence of a number of probes as in the previous solution
sketch. Rather than letting the probes carry a message through the universe,
we assume that the probes transmit messages that can be picked up either by
other probes or by extraterrestrials. To achieve this, the probes must be capable
of determining the artificiality of received signals, and capable of transmitting a
directed signal to the N nearest stellar systems. Each probe has a buffer for M
messages. Periodically, the probe sends one of the buffered messages (according
to a predefined probability distribution) in the direction of a randomly chosen
neighboring stellar system. Upon detection of an artificial signal that is not yet
buffered, the signal is stored in the buffer. In case the buffer is full, the oldest
stored message is deleted.
Initially, the buffer contains one predefined artificial message. This is to notify
any potential recipients that there is intelligent life in the universe, capable of
communicating via such signals. Implicitly, this invites any recipient to reply
via a similarly artificial signal. Figure 1a depicts the transmission of a message
3 This increases the burden of extraterrestrials trying to trace their reply back to us.
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a. Sending a message from Earth (E) b. Alien reply (A).
Fig. 1. Example of a Random Relay Network.
For a Random Relay Network to provide location privacy, the adversary
must not be able to trace the original message to its source, nor the reply to
its intended receiver. Since each node in the network acts as a source for any
received signal, this in turn implies that an adversary who does not have a
global view of the network (i.e., which messages exist in the network, and which
node sends what message when and where to) cannot determine the origin of a
signal. An adversary could establish such a global view in various ways: either
by having sufficient detection capabilities, or by travelling to each node of the
network and eavesdropping. Therefore, for long-distance communication where
both sender and receiver reside in the same galaxy, a Random Relay Network
provides location privacy against adversaries with less detection capabilities than
D3, and less travel capabilities than T3.
4.3 Some General Observations on Privacy Controls
Any interstellar communication must inherently leave some traces of its origin:
for indirect communication, the physical infrastructure leaves such traces, e.g., a
tell-tale matter signature; for direct communication, the propagation properties
of the signal itself provide some guidance to its origin. A mitigating counter-
measure is a “generational” probe approach, where a device flies to an ore-rich
stellar body and constructs new probes from the raw material. This approach
provides security from any civilization with travel capabilities below T3. From
T3 on, the extraterrestrials could trace each generation back to its point of ori-
gin. For direct communication, a mitigation is to emit a signal such that there
are multiple possible origins (i.e., multiple stellar systems on the line from the
receiver in the direction of the sender). This will work for civilizations below D3.
A D3 civilization has sufficient detection capabilities to distinguish the genuine
origin amongst the candidates. Thus, probes and signals inherently carry some
traces leading back to their point of origin.
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Message contents may carry such a trace as well. It is already common prac-
tice for some companies to tailor their web presence to the visitor [8]. Similarly,
each message sent out could carry a distinct element (e.g., a nonce). This allows
the sender to link any reply containing the message to the direction the message
was sent to.
A defence against such shenanigans is to spread out the detection and reply
capabilities on an interstellar level. One instance is to create honeyplanets. Much
like the so-called “honeypots” on the Internet, honeyplanets provide an alluring
target. To all appearances, these planets contain intelligent life. However, in real-
ity such a location merely hosts a careful simulation of an intelligent civilization
on a stellar body. Close monitoring of the honeyplanet then allows insight into
the extraterrestrials that interact with it.
Finally, security controls may be based on implicit assumptions. By consid-
ering typical controls in an extreme setting such as interstellar communication,
their limitations are clarified, allowing researchers to work on further improving
such controls.
5 Additional Security Requirements
Setting up a communication with extraterrestrials requires a coordinated effort.
There should be agreement on a wide range of issues including who speaks for the
Earth and what should be said [10], [7]. Protocols and policies to that effect have
been discussed and proposed [3], [11]. However, even if a so-called post-detection
policy is agreed upon by all nations, there still may be dissenting cabals.
Communication with extraterrestrials requires therefore protection against
both Earth-bound and extraterrestrial adversaries. We have described first ideas
for location-private communication in the preceding section. However, the se-
curity requirements that first come to mind in a communication protocol are
authentication of the communication partners and integrity and confidentiality
of communicated messages. Here we briefly discuss these requirements.
We start by considering these requirements against an extraterrestrial ad-
versary and note that all three of these properties are probably too much to
hope for. To authenticate an entity ET we must be able to distinguish between
ET and a potential impostor. When we make first contact, we cannot know with
whom the contact was established. We therefore have to settle for a weaker prop-
erty, namely sender invariance [2]. That is, we can try to verify that subsequent
messages originate with the same communication partner, and we conversely
provide evidence that the sequence of messages sent from us has a single origin.
Earth-bound protocols that achieve sender-invariance employ public key cryp-
tography and assume that the communicating parties execute the same protocol.
For integrity protection of a message, the communicating party must know how
to verify the integrity. If an attacker relays all messages between us and the
extraterrestrials and strips off the protections, the receiving party will not be
aware of the existence of an integrity protection and will not be able to detect
any tampering. Similarly, no standard notion of confidentiality appears to be
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achievable. Any key received by a party could be received and modified by an
extraterrestrial attacker. Protocols that establish a shared key by taking advan-
tage of the sender-invariance property are conceivable, but appear to lead to a
very weak notion of confidentiality.
If we consider terrestrial attackers, we have to assume that they are able to
eavesdrop on all communication and that they can send arbitrary messages to
the extraterrestrials. It seems plausible to assume that a terrestrial attacker will
not be able to imperceptibly modify transmissions and to act as a man-in-the
middle. We may moreover assume that the terrestrial adversary has compara-
ble computational resources. Under these conditions it appears easier to achieve
sender-invariance, integrity protection, and confidentiality (against terrestrial
adversaries), but it is still an open problem. It is unclear whether any scheme of-
fering computational security (with insanely large keys) could possibly be used,
as it depends on our present computational ability, the extraterrestrials’ com-
putational ability in a distant future, and our descendants’ adversaries’ abilities
in a further distant future. To be on the safe side, any security and privacy con-
trols would need to be based exclusively on the laws of nature. Unfortunately,
mankind’s understanding of these laws is imperfect, and any security control we
devise may thus be circumvented.
Given the time scales involved, any long-distance interstellar communica-
tion faces additional problems. For one, how to ensure that the receiver is not
accidentally replying to an old message sent by himself? This requires that the
existence, importance, and operational details of the system are kept alive over a
very long period of time. This in turn requires reliable communication to human-
ity’s future generations. How to reliably, authentically, or securely communicate
information over very long periods of time is an interesting question in its own
right and one that needs to be answered before an attempt at communication
with extraterrestrials is started.
6 Conclusions
Trying to contact extraterrestrials entails the risk of revealing our location. This
paper approached this location-privacy issue as a secure communications prob-
lem, and provided some initial steps towards a classification of attacker capabil-
ities in line with the Kardashev scale, and put forth initial concepts for security
controls at intergalactic scales.
We reiterate that mankind must not attempt to contact extraterrestrials
without proper security provisions, as we are not able to oversee the risks of
exposing our location. Consequently, we should stop sending messages and even
consider the destruction of space probes like the Pioneer 11, which are already
on their way with a mission to reveal our location. During this moratorium the
security and privacy aspects of communication with extraterrestrials must be
researched. We can already suggest a few research questions:
– Are there (im)possibility results of location-private communication with ex-
traterrestrials, possibly in relation to adversary models and defender capabil-
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ities? For instance, it might be conceivable that location-private communi-
cation is impossible as long as mankind has level T2.
– How can we scale up existing security solutions to a galactic scale? One
could think of sensor networks, onion routing, or even honeyplanets.
– Which security requirements, in addition to location privacy, should be con-
sidered? We can consider the standard CIA properties, but also properties
like fairness and detection of malicious content.
– Can we develop a future-proof infrastructure? We observe that our technol-
ogy develops fast in relation to the time scales expected for communication
with extraterrestrials. As a consequence, all current communication attempts
and corresponding infrastructure will be outdated long before we can even
expect a reply to our messages. However, we may discover new vulnerabilities
in our own infrastructure, requiring a protocol update, or even revocation of
the whole infrastructure.
– How to estimate the impact of extraterrestrial adversary capabilities? We
took a first step towards a classification of adversary capabilities, to esti-
mate the impact of adversary capabilities. This initial classification should
be further extended. For example, there is a significant difference between
the ability to focus detection capabilities on a particular location (what is
exactly there?), and detect any significant changes in an area.
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